Words without Discourse: Creative Strategies on Free Improvisation.
Manuel Falleiros
2.3. Possibilities of the Narrative
What ensures, in a narrative, the pact established between the author and the reader is the idea of verisimilitude. This does not concern a faithful representation of the world, but an internal verisimilitude managed by the text’s own regulations. It is in this way that the reader, placing their trust in the author, receives in return a kind of truth stemming from the understanding of the text, which momentarily satisfies them.
A scientific narrative generally relies on the presentation of confirmed events or experiences, affirmed by controlled repetition, with the intention of making us believe that similar future events should be expected. Historically, this procedure became known as the representative of rational thought. The narrative of invented stories, the narrative of fiction, on the other hand, brings the possibility of a leap into events that lie beyond what is considered possible by rational thought.
The fictional narrative launches the event into the space of speculation. To achieve this, it is necessary for the “reader” of this narrative to detach themselves from the rational reference that demands external and universal proofs and immerse themselves in the particularity inherent to the fictional world, thus establishing this pact with the work. A narrative that intends to describe an event in its present instant, in turn, should be formulated through the constant clash of redoing and reorganizing that would ensue from the encounter between the rational and the fictional narrative. Constructing a narrative that aims to present the present event, such as improvisation, requires that, first and foremost, an account be made of the understanding of the relationship between poetics and observation and, consequently, of the idiosyncrasies of each artistic making.
The account of an improvisation can become a pale attempt to describe the forces inflected in the musical creative act. Part of these forces are not reproducible in the description, as the mediation of experience favors a taking of position by the narrator, inducing a specific perception. Aware of these deficiencies, we will deliberately assume our position as researchers of the creative genesis, restricting ourselves to the qualifiable “clues” to demonstrate the construction of a narrative that aspires to produce a description of the intangible. In this delicate intervention, we will need to deal with the relationship of artistic construction; deal with the role of the spectator, since the improviser also listens carefully; deal with the improvising creator artist and their relationship with time. The spectator’s activities will serve as a basis for us to establish an observational relationship that also reaches an aesthetic sense of artistic making; to this end, we will institute, from this point of view, the position and relationship with the process of apprehension.
The improviser is also the appreciator of the work at the very moment it happens. In the creative process, this fact is substantially important because part of what they are creating is based on their apprehension and perception. In this moment of creation, the improviser can present distinct forms of perception of the musical material with which they are involved.
When we consider a work in the sense of Eco’s (1976) definition of a closed work, we mean that it should be considered immutable in relation to its comprehension and interpretation. However, we can verify that the increment of the perceptive apparatuses of an appreciator can profoundly change their relationship with the work. The same would happen to an appreciator who keeps their apparatuses grounded and fixed in a previous learning, but perceives the difference between distinct interpretations of the same work. A third hypothetical framework would be one in which we would consider the two poles of this negotiation as if they were fixed: the closed work (from which it is agreed that it must possess a specific comprehension) and the one who apprehends it (impassive in their perceptive form). This kind of fixed relationship, in which at least one of the points (appreciator or work) places itself as temporally immutable, may not be an adequate thought for the performing arts, which have a more dynamic perceptive quality.
The last hypothetical framework presented above would oppose the mode we wish to describe in relation to what we consider as performing arts. In this model, it is not possible to consider that any of the poles present, all the time, this quality of fixation. The artistic making is not found finished and ready to receive a unique mode of appreciation. For the researcher who produces a narrative that describes this dynamic form, their focus is also the search for clues that could be present, that is: following a trail of footprints without it being completely clear, in short, carrying out a subversion of time. What is possible to say in relation to time is what it accuses us of: the differences we are capable of observing. For the development of a narrative of this type, it is more important to rely on a field of probabilities than to turn to verifications; thus, what must be ascertained is whether such clues could be present. Following this intuited movement is an operation that encompasses both divination and deciphering, and for both, it is necessary to use abstract mental operations, the dependence on repeated observation of events, and constant speculation and launching of hypotheses. We find the formalization of this thought in various branches of science, and among them, we point to the mental operations described by Charles Sanders Peirce [16].
Peirce asserts that, just like an animal’s instinct, human beings possess a faculty of the same nature, which inclines us to opt for the true principle in the process of acquiring knowledge in a general way, from inferential data, even before it is possible to ascertain its value as truth. He believes that this is an innate characteristic of the human being.
If all knowledge depends on the formation of a hypothesis, however, “it seems, at first glance, that there is no room for the question of how this would be sustained, since, as a matter of fact, only a may be is inferred (it may be and it may not be). There is, however, a decisive inclination towards the affirmative side and the frequency with which this turns out to be a true fact is… almost the most surprising of all the prodigies of the universe.” (Eco & Sebeok, 1983, p. 20)
According to Peirce, the human mind evolved gradually, inclining us towards truth through instinct. “An adaptive mind with an appropriate disposition possesses a natural light, a light of nature, namely, the faculty of abductive perception of real generality” (Santaella, 2004, p. 106). This faculty manifests itself especially in the face of the mental operation known as abduction, which, according to Peirce, consists of spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reactions:
Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation that introduces any new idea, for induction cannot determine any single value, and deduction merely develops the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. (Peirce, 2000, p. 220)
Abduction is not properly a demonstrative type of operation; rather, it is an intuition that proceeds “step-by-step” to reach a conclusion. Abduction is the search for a conclusion from the rational interpretation of signals, clues, and signs. For abduction to take effect, it is essential that there be the presence of an observing spirit that will not let any clue escape that might be of interest to an investigation. Abductive reasoning can operate exclusively based on a large number of clues or signs collected by the researcher. Once a substantial amount of “material” for work has been gathered, abduction implies the creation of various explanatory hypotheses. From this moment on, an activity of intense imagination and creativity is required:
Abduction, or, the “first step of scientific reasoning” (7.218) as well as the “only type of argument that starts a new idea” (2.97), is an instinct that trusts in the unconscious perception of connections between aspects of the world, or, using another set of terms, it is the subliminal communication of messages. (Eco & Sebeok, 1983, p. 23)
However, our inclination towards truth does not guarantee that our hypotheses are infallible in revealing an event. Abduction alone does not guarantee the development of ideas that can be verified; it requires a kind of “confirmation” given by the other operations known as induction and deduction. These last two operations are complementary to the abductive process in the formulation of new knowledge or an investigation. In this way, it is possible to know something as true through this set of operations:
[…] Peirce maintained that a hypothesis should always be considered as a question and, although all new knowledge arises from conjectures, they are useless without the test of verification. Sherlock comments to Watson, in SPEC, “how dangerous it is always to reason from insufficient data.” The detective also seems to agree with Peirce (2.635; 6.524; 7.202) that prejudices, or hypotheses that we are reluctant to submit to the test of induction, are the greatest obstacle to successful reasoning. (Eco & Sebeok, 1983, p. 29)
Let us take as an example a section of contemporary improvisation performed by a group of instrumentalists. In this improvisation section, we can question the manner of construction of the performance and raise the following issue regarding the complexity of the interactive process:
Do the musicians listen to each and every musical idea launched or that emerges?
Let us imagine for a moment that we are inclined by our instinct (abduction) to the answer no. The answer no accuses a general idea about improvisation: the idea that contemporary improvisation is made of uncoordinated, disconnected, and unintentional sonic flows. Let us suppose that an improvisation occurs in a very short space of time, performed by only two instrumentalists who listen to each other mutually and with great attention; and the result of this interaction is melodies and counterpoints with sparse contours in time. In this case, our initial question could lead us to another answer, after all, in this framework, it is quite possible that both musicians perfectly listen to every musical idea that each one would launch.
Deduction enables us to establish an explanatory result from known facts. To do this, one must posit an accepted or verified general rule, which in our case could be translated as:
No musician involved in the improvisational process can listen to all musical ideas at the same time they play;
and it follows from a particular case:
These improvisers engaged in an interactive improvisational process;
which results in:
These improvisers could not listen to all musical ideas at the same time they were playing.
Therefore, we start from a general case to establish an explanation from the particular. In Induction, on the other hand, a particular case initiates the process:
These improvisers interacted with each other in an improvisational process;
and it follows from an observed fact:
These improvisers, in their interactive act, could not listen to all musical ideas;
and finally, from this, we present a general rule:
One cannot listen to all musical ideas when interactively involved in an improvisation.
Induction starts from a particular case that is contrasted with an observed fact, ultimately generating a general law.
These answers were only possible because we assumed that certain conditions were in place, imagining that there would be many musicians involved and intentionally interacting with each other with a will to listen, and that there were no deliberately sparse musical moments, and that there would be a constant sonic flow. Without these data, the answer could be entirely opposite. Thus, it is very important that the study in Creative Processes receives from this theory an increment in the description and investigation of the creative core, since the observation and interpretation of storage records welcome the considered works of art (Fixed) well, but do not guarantee us statements about the core of Dynamic poetics.
For the construction of the hypothesis, it is necessary to gather many clues and observe data referring to the environment in which they are found. This entire process can generate a fallible result if we work with a low sampling of data. Few data, or clues, can widely distort the result and encourage us to contradictory or absurd statements. The researcher who makes use of this method of analysis, ignoring that in a contemporary improvisation musicians do not read scores nor need mediating codes, may fall into the error of trying to adapt their hypotheses. Considering the universe of music mediated by the score or another set of prescriptions, the researcher would be compelled to find by adaptation an element that, in the reality of improvised music, does not exist, and thus develop a distorted narrative. This means that a researcher who undertakes to observe only a single performance of improvisation will probably tend to admit hypotheses that create an explanatory narrative based on the improviser’s “personal taste,” or musical “clichés” used, or even worse, on “chance.” Therefore, it is not enough to base ourselves solely on verification to obtain a guarantee in the formulation of hypotheses; it is necessary to have many clues and specific data:
An inference based on a limited number of examples may very well be wrong, but when the tested sampling is broadened, reason begins to approach the truth […]. This kind of convergence towards truth is achieved by the method of prolonging experience, that is, the method that requires science never to cease continuing. (Santaella, 2004, p. 157)
Even so, many data are inoperative within the construction and testing of hypotheses, just as an observation that intends to be merely descriptive is useless for this type of investigation. The observation that generates a very elementary narrative is one that does not concern itself with projecting thought beyond the observed fact in order to explain an occurrence, nor does it concern itself with its consequences. The observation and analysis of an improvisation session done without the intention of observing, from clues that resignify musical actions, constructions, formulations, and wills within the interaction between musicians, would become a description, however detailed it might be, useless in the construction of hypotheses. In an improvisation session, multiple confluences of forces occur that act upon the music that will be generated. An example would be the approximation between the interactions that generate the improvisation and how the musicians feel regarding their well-being and their mental state, which is influenced by the environment in which they improvise. An improvisation made on the “stage” takes place substantially differently from one performed in a “studio” or one in an “atelier.” Observing a distracted attitude on the part of the musicians involved in a “stage” improvisation can be explained more likely as a reflection of a condition of discomfort due to the tension caused by the courtesies of the presentation, different from how the same condition of inattention would probably be explained in an “atelier” improvisation.
The researcher who will create hypotheses must be attentive to the relationship of the environment with each observed practice. It is necessary, not only to observe, but to select the “best” hypothesis, the one that is most “simple,” most adequate:
What makes Sherlock Holmes so successful in his investigations is not the fact that he does not make assumptions, but that he makes them exceptionally well. De facto, involuntarily, he follows Peirce’s advice to select the best hypotheses (see 7.220-320). Paraphrasing Peirce’s statement, we could say that the best hypothesis is the one that is simplest and most natural, the easiest and least costly to check and that, furthermore, contributes to an understanding of the broadest spectrum of possible facts. (Eco & Sebeok, 1983, pp. 27–28)
Assumptions must be the most reasonable for each circumstance; that is, they must take into account the moment involved, as well as the surrounding environment. The secret to Detective Holmes’s success is to choose the simplest hypotheses and then fragment and test them, thus managing to verify the facts in a quick and reliable manner. From him, we learn that in the exercise of perception (observation), we must consider the means and circumstances involved in the environment broadly, but guard ourselves against our perceptive flaws.
Our perceptive limitation is perhaps the greatest problem in the apprehension of facts for the formulation of hypotheses. In arts research, this problem is aggravated by the fact that the arts possess the capacity to cause a disturbing and transformative effect on our being. On the other hand, an analysis of purported impartiality of music as creative art would also make no sense. That is, completely stripping away the effects we obtain from the creative operation is not aligned with our investigative proposal. Thus, we will have to understand how the inherence of perceptive flaws articulates with the narrative of the creative experience. Francis Bacon [17] presents to us in his theory of the “Idols” which correspond to the limits of human perception.
Bacon’s four idols, namely: Idola Tribus, Idola Specus, Idola Fori, and Idola Theatri, warn us of the partialities that interfere with our perception and distort observation. For Bacon, the Idola Specus and the Idola Tribus are innate idols and, therefore, difficult to eradicate, and in some passages, Bacon believes this to be impossible. For Bacon, understanding is a hostage to these systematic errors. The Idola Tribus is the biased generality of favorable cases, or that which is convenient to us; that is, a law once agreed upon by the intellect is used to interpret all others, so that understanding lets itself be carried away in advance by what it has elected, even if nothing is proven and the greater examples in quantity and importance are on the opposite side. Our observation and interpretation fail because our own cognitive apparatus functions through distortions. An improvisation session, if agreed to be representative for having presented certain expected qualities, may come to become a prime example for the others, which would lead us to incur an interpretative flaw by establishing a mythical approximation with the other sessions. In a subsequent discussion about an improvisation session, the musicians agree and generalize its success because they expected it to be so, and thus adapt the interpretation of the facts by omitting their flaws. Interpretations that are favorable to us are accepted, but not in a merely positive sense, rather those linked to what was previously elected to aspire to see.
The Idola Specus reflects upon the errors given by each one’s subjective impression, by their formation and culture that gives the disposition for an interpretation of reality. Also, their personal preferences and the admiration of the ancient as truth and of the new as revelation; that is, turning to these points instead of establishing judgments about them. In this way, familiar and current things are not examined in their causes. Different perceptions about the same improvisation session, given by distinct musicians, can lead us to the dungeon of individualistic reason that imprisons us and distances us from obtaining information about musical processes, and thus, tends towards an explanation for a set of personal convictions attributed, in the end, to taste.
Idola Fori presents itself as an error relative to the problems of the employment of words in the explanation of facts. It presents itself as expressions meticulously woven but, nevertheless, flawed. It is the opportunism of specialized language, which can manifest in the interpretation of an improvisation session narrated by worn-out and inadequate clichés and expressions. As when forcefully, out of intellectual indolence, we delight in poor inventions and adaptations. A musician or researcher may take a lot of their breath to explain how a sound would correspond to a color, when the analogy would not explain much about the process and there would be a more musically adequate expression for greater explanatory precision.
Idola Theatri speaks about systems that lack demonstration, generally promoted by an authority and passively accepted by others. They are the fanciful prevailing theories and principles that we accept from an arbitrary pronouncement. Perhaps this is the easiest to observe: a reigning language is ensured by the legitimized authority, which invents a system that does not need to be put to the test. Taking into account the characteristics we presented earlier about the performance arts and their Dynamic qualities, we must not rush to attribute relationships with patterns of observation accepted by authorities of faith or tradition. A line of thought based on the musical tradition could affirm that improvisation is a variation upon something. However, in contemporary improvisation, it often does not deal with or start from the variation of thematic or sonic material. Or even that improvisation is a making “to the taste” of the one who improvises, making it impossible and uninteresting to draw attention to it. Improvisation could be considered a heap of technical-musical clichés, or even considered a non-composition. These ideas uttered by the authorities on the subject, distributed in books and manuals, would certainly produce a distorted observation of the type of improvised musical realization that we undertake to discuss here. An event arising in an improvisation session that does not meet the reigning standard could simply go unheard.
For Bacon, even if it is impossible to end these idols, we must try to reduce or replace them. To achieve this, we can choose the option not to refute them, but to reformulate them. “According to Bacon, ‘confronting madness will only exacerbate it’ and will lead spirits to close in on themselves. If it is necessary to engage man in a new scientific enterprise, one must seek a means, he suggests, to insinuate oneself into spirits” (Eva, 2008, p. 81).
This approximation that we are proposing, between Bacon’s doctrine and Peirce’s formulations, contributes to the sharper observation of the clues necessary for the construction of the explanatory narrative about the creative process through the analysis method proposed by the Evidential Paradigm. The concepts presented here regarding Genetic Criticism, followed by studies in Creative Process, expanded by the Evidential Paradigm, having their narrative structured by logical cognitive processes and safeguarded from ontologically innate flaws, constitute our methodological framework for the treatment of data obtained from the experiences carried out in the atelier. With this, we believe it is possible to carry out an analysis of the creation process within an environment in constant construction, which is the environment of the performing arts, and especially, that of Free Improvisation.
Notes
[16] Born in 1839, in Cambridge, he graduated from Harvard in Physics and Mathematics, and as a Chemist at the Lawrence Scientific School, studied linguistics, philology, and history, with contributions in the field of psychology. Considered the “father” of semiotics.
[17] Francis Bacon was born in London in 1561. He was a politician, philosopher, and essayist, and is considered the founder of modern science. He wrote Novum Organum, in 1620, part of a larger unfinished work called Instauratio Magna, which aimed at a reform in Science.